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1. Introduction 
The governance of cyberspace confronts states with traditional questions of 
sovereignty and identity: can they provide for their own security, or do they rely on the 
protection of other, more technologically advanced nations? Do they shape their identity 
in international security by following their own values or do they compromise their 
interests for the sake of cooperation? In the recent NSA surveillance scandal, these rather 
traditional questions have erupted in a new light. While appearing as a short-term security 
issue at first, the tension over surveillance has solidified the ways in which sovereignty 
manifests itself in cyberspace. A yet relatively unregulated space, the Internet possesses 
unique features such as the interconnectedness of users, the ambiguity of jurisdiction, and 
the accessibility of private information in a public domain. While all of these factors 
require an adaptation in defining state sovereignty in cyberspace, the NSA scandal has 
demonstrated that states project traditional, pre-existing values, and perspectives on the 
exercise of power onto cyberspace. This lack of adaptation in a new environment causes 
a long-term governance issue that will inevitably require more transparency and the 
defining of international norms. 
The analysis of the NSA scandal through the lens of German foreign policy 
exemplifies this issue most eminently. Despite having gradually regained its sovereignty 
and identity in international security affairs in the post-war period, Germany took on a 
unique role in the scandal as the main target of the surveillance program (DW, 2013). 
Desiring a more independent position in security policy and valuing the protection 
privacy, the state finds itself in a transition phase in the transatlantic partnership: as 
Europe as a whole carries more weight in international security, the demand for U.S. 
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influence in European security policy has decreased (Zimmerman, 2005, 143). However, 
the lack of regulation and state legitimacy in cyberspace allowed the United States to 
enforce its values in international security and hold on to its desired scope of influence 
over European security. The dichotomy between intelligence and privacy—the security 
interests of the respective opposing sides—causes an irreconcilable governance issue. 
This dynamic demonstrates how pre-existing values and power structures in international 
affairs do not translate onto cyberspace. Instead, the clashes of opposing interests become 
intensified. 
 
Threats and Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
 The diversity of actors in the Internet has complicated the definition of state 
sovereignty beyond the realm of territories. If not compromising state sovereignty, it has, 
at the least, raised questions over how sovereignty manifests itself in a yet largely 
“ungoverned” virtual territory (Nye, 2003, 68). The cyber age, therefore, presents new 
challenges for long-term governance.  
 The development of postwar Germany is an exemplary case of the traditional 
sense of sovereignty. German normalization, the broad term under which the regaining of 
sovereignty falls, represented a decline of external control over its foreign policy. A 
regaining of sovereignty also included rearmament and the dismissal of the occupation 
statute by the allies, a step that granted the German administration full control over its 
territory (Haftendorn, 2006, 15). German sovereignty also signified the legitimization of 
the newly arranged government, a factor that carries a lot of symbolic value (14). 
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 Cyberspace complicates these traditional factors. The interconnectedness of actors 
operating online eliminates the territorial approach to defining sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. The resulting ambiguity of legal boundaries and the seeming absence of state 
control in the Internet complicate the physical manifestation and legitimization of state 
sovereignty. While governments employ architectural methods to symbolically represent 
sovereignty, private corporations take on a greater physical presence as they provide the 
services enabling the exchange of information. The transformation of private information 
into the public sphere, however, has extended the scope by which states can execute their 
sovereignty and security objectives. In this way, cyberspace limits sovereignty in its 
physical representation but facilitates its enforcement in security affairs.  
 This facilitation has raised the question whether cyberspace generates significant 
threats to national security. Advancements in technology have always influenced not only 
warfare and conflict but also the actors involved and the likelihood of conflict to occur 
(Andrews, 2012, 91). Cyber technology in particular has facilitated the means of warfare 
for a broader range of actors. Valuable targets such as government secrets, individual 
financial and personal information are more accessible than ever, as the Internet has 
dissolved the challenges brought forth by geography (91). Jurisdiction, physical security, 
and financial aspects have traditionally posed challenges to non-state actors in the 
security realm. The newly gained accessibility and ambiguity of jurisdiction have 
encouraged an increase in threats originating from non-state actors. In 2012, the 
Department of Homeland Security documented 198 cyber attacks targeting the 
information systems of private companies in several industrial sectors, a 52 percent 
increase from the previous year (Goldman, 2013). The attacks posed a security threat to 
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U.S. infrastructure, with the energy sector recording 82 of these attacks (Goldman, 2013). 
Most cases not only remain unreported but also unresolved (Goldman; Andres). Parallel 
to the rise of non-state involvement, states have increasingly used force in what James 
Adams called a “new international battlefield” in 2001. With over 30 states having 
invested in advancing their capacity for cyber warfare, nations now have the capability to 
attack the defense systems and infrastructures of foreign governments. Most notably, this 
strategy of virtual warfare was employed in Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 
(Adams, 102; Reveron, 2012, 3).  
 While the new landscape of actors and online threats do not necessarily impact 
state sovereignty but rather require its adaptation, the act of cyber surveillance conducted 
by states brings forth more pressing questions on sovereignty. Particularly in cases in 
which surveillance does not represent an act of war but a preemptive security measure, a 
technologically advanced state can undermine the sovereignty of other actors by 
enforcing its security objectives at the cost of values and legal systems present in other 
states. Cyber surveillance, therefore, can be distinguished in the debate on cyber security 
and sovereignty.  
 The first chapter will focus on the ways in which sovereignty manifests itself in 
cyberspace and how states project their values in security onto this space. These themes 
spark the question of cyber security—does cyberspace generate a security risk? This 
question will solidify broader mechanisms of power and sovereignty that will eventually 
lead into the discussion of German foreign policy and current power constellations in 
transatlantic relations. This historical approach will help me analyze the ways in which 
traditional perceptions of power and sovereignty have manifested themselves in the NSA 
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surveillance scandal and the implementation of cyber security measures in the United 
States and Germany. 
 
 
 
2. Sovereignty in the Cyber Age 
Adapting Sovereignty 
 The emergence of cyberspace has caused a critical need to adapt our 
understanding of sovereignty. This question appears as urgent not only because of 
reasons linked to international security but also because of the long-term governance 
issue cyberspace entails. While the NSA scandal has brought forth the issue of cyber 
security, it has also demonstrated that the ways in which states approach cyber security 
has implications for civil liberties in a space lacking international norms. As sovereign 
states hold different values and implement different measures to ensure the civil liberties 
of their citizens, it is significant to understand how sovereignty is defined and manifests 
itself in cyberspace. In this way, the emergence of cyberspace has created a chain 
reaction: the exercise of cyber security by one state poses a threat to the sovereignty of 
another, undermining this state’s security objectives and protection of its citizens’ civil 
liberties. This dilemma in turn causes the need to reflect on sovereignty and collaboration 
through international norms in cyberspace. 
Cyberspace complicates our understanding of sovereignty as a result of three 
distinct features: (1) the ambiguity of the legitimacy of power, (2) the interconnectedness 
of actors and resulting ambiguity of jurisdiction, (3) the accessibility of private 
information in a public domain. The analysis of these three components indicates that 
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cyberspace requires a redefinition of sovereignty and an adaptation of the ways in which 
states exercise their sovereignty in cyberspace. 
 Traditionally, the construction of sovereignty required the acknowledgment of 
implementing institutions, granting them the legitimacy to govern within a defined 
territory. In cyberspace, however, legitimacy remains more ambiguous than in the 
physical world. This ambiguity is created in part through the culture the Internet has 
produced. The wealth or even affluence of information, the ability to exchange this 
information with users throughout the globe, and the dissolving of physical boundaries 
have instilled a sense of illimitability and seeming absence of state power. Users of 
spaces offered by private corporations such as social media platforms have the ability to 
produce and individualize information. The major external entities setting the limits of 
and regulating this production are the corporations offering this space. The privatization 
of the Internet and its effective enabling of interconnectivity consequently seem to 
contradict regulation by governmental institutions. This contradiction is amplified by the 
difficulty in representing state sovereignty in a virtual world. While states employ 
physical representations such as monuments, governmental institutions, and other 
architectural symbols of sovereignty and legitimacy, the lack of such representations in a 
virtual space complicates the instilling a sense of legitimacy.  
 The virtual absence of the state in cyberspace also relates to the ambiguity of 
territory and jurisdiction. As the traditional definition of the sovereignty of states has 
heavily relied on territorial boundaries and jurisdiction, the interconnectedness of the 
Internet inevitably challenges this definition. International corporations such as social 
media sites or search engines host spaces for citizens to exchange information throughout 
 11 
the world. Every information exchange can cross from one jurisdiction to the other. As 
some states such as China have enforced their jurisdiction by limiting or controlling their 
citizens’ use of these spaces, others have remained in the background in regulating online 
information exchange. Both of these approaches come along with their individual sets of 
problems. A limitation of exchange of or access to information may undermine civil 
liberties such as freedom of speech. An unregulated cyberspace leaves citizens 
unprotected from criminal activity originating from domestic or foreign perpetrators. In 
the case of foreign perpetrators, the lack of territorial jurisdiction complicates their 
prosecution. Both foreign criminals and the intelligence services of other states can 
therefore attack or infringe upon the civil liberties of sub-entities of a state without 
crossing any territorial borders. While such infiltration into the territory of a state would 
have traditionally been defined as an undermining of state sovereignty and violated 
international law, the virtual nature of cyberspace complicates this traditional definition. 
The interconnectedness of users, therefore, suggests that jurisdiction cannot be enforced 
through clear territorial borders but requires an adaptation so that the international 
community can clearly define the infringement of state sovereignty in cyberspace. 
 The issue of shifting private information into the public domain pertains to the 
limitation of state sovereignty. The private, physical space occupied by citizens 
represents the limits of state sovereignty in many countries, manifesting itself in privacy 
laws in Europe or the Fourth Amendment in the United States, which prevents 
warrantless searches of private homes. Cyberspace has complicated the definition of 
privacy infringement as citizens occupy their own virtual space on the one hand but also 
publish their private information in a public domain. The absence of clear jurisdictional 
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boundaries, the fading distinction between the private and public sphere in cyberspace, 
and the technological capacity to access the private sphere of individuals across the world 
without the knowledge of the users have created the possibility that states widen and 
overstep the boundaries of their sovereignty that have traditionally limited them in the 
physical world. The accessibility of private information, therefore, sparks the debate over 
the scope of sovereignty in a virtual space that provides an affluence of new ways in 
which states can enforce their sovereignty.  
  
Enforcing Sovereignty 
 The three ways in which cyberspace complicates traditional views on sovereignty 
consequently raises the question how sovereignty manifests itself in cyberspace. The 
NSA scandal showed that current governance of cyberspace is quite security oriented and 
that sovereignty manifests itself in the way in which states implement security measures 
to enforce their objectives. Two distinct ways have surfaced through this scandal and help 
explain security policy decisions in cyberspace: First, states enforce their sovereignty 
based on their perception of security threats, which originates from underlying values in 
international security. Second, states attempt to maintain pre-existing power structures 
and maximize their autonomy in cyberspace.  
The definition and perception of security threats in cyberspace has remained 
ambiguous and varies across different nations. This ambiguity seems to have instilled 
uncertainty and fear, resulting in exaggerated security measures. As the perception of 
threats depends in part on cultural factors, sovereignty manifests itself in the ways in 
which states project their values onto cyberspace and enforce these values in their 
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treatment of data and information. States that value the protection of privacy, for 
instance, perceive an infringement of privacy as a security threat and will implement 
policies accordingly. States that value a strong governmental presence in shaping political 
culture will perceive the exchange of and access to certain information as a security threat 
and take a more proactive approach to limiting these uses of the Internet. States that value 
the physical protection of their citizens will perceive information exchange as an 
opportunity to oversee communication and prevent possible acts of terrorism. In all of 
these cases, the ambiguity of the virtual space has the potential to create fear and 
uncertainty: to what extent does technology enable actors to access private information? 
What is the potential of information exchange and knowledge with regards to political 
activism? Do extremist groups have the technological sophistication to facilitate or even 
execute terrorist attacks in cyberspace? As these questions raise even more uncertainties, 
the NSA scandal has demonstrated that states tend to compensate for a lack of knowledge 
through extensive and proactive security measures. 
Simultaneously, these security measures pertain to the maintenance of power and 
ways of governing. While the protection of privacy, the control of information exchange, 
and the gathering of information or intelligence purposes have always played a role in 
exercising state sovereignty, cyberspace has intensified the scope by which these 
measures have to be carried out: privacy pertains to a broader range of actors and data, 
information exchange occurs on a more frequent and interconnected basis, and security-
related information is increasingly accessible. Maximizing the capacity and autonomy by 
which these measures can be implemented, states attempt to maintain pre-existing ways 
of exercising power in a space that intensifies the clash of security objectives. In the NSA 
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case, for instance, the United States projected its military power onto cyberspace and 
maintained its pre-existing leadership and autonomy within the transatlantic partnership. 
The gathering of data represented the major tool of this militarization and enforcing of 
U.S. sovereignty.  
 
A Need for Surveillance? 
 
 The emergence of information technology has added a wide range of problems to 
ensuring national security (Gravelle, 2012, 111). As many opportunities as the Internet 
provides to corporations and Internet users, it also provides opportunities to extremists 
and hackers. The unique characteristic of cyberspace is the simplicity of access. While 
other realms of operation for terrorists require financial investment, cyberspace requires 
only technological knowledge and devices that connect to the Internet (Reveron, 2012, 
7). The infrastructures of the state and the energy sector, bank accounts of private 
individuals, operating systems of government agencies, and data stored by large 
corporations are directly accessible and vulnerable targets to a wider range of actors (11). 
In fact, individuals and non-state actors conduct most malicious activity on the Internet 
while some attacks can be traced back to government-sponsored programs (11). The wide 
range of actors and unlawful actions in cyberspace complicate the definition of cyber 
terrorism and its threat to international security. However, the NSA surveillance scandal 
has uncovered the existence of both incentives for states to conduct cyber surveillance 
and differences in the values and priorities they project onto cyber security programs. It 
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has raised the question whether these incentives originate from real threats and 
opportunities.  
 The definition of cyber terrorism has derived from a wider spectrum of uses of 
cyberspace for illegal purposes and is more ambiguous than the definition of cyber 
warfare (Awan, 2012, 23). Timothy Thomas notes that the “Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital 
property to intimidate or coerce people” (Thomas, 2003, 112-13). Similarly, scholars 
such as Gabriel Weimann (2004) see cyber threats as generally unlawful means to attack 
the infrastructures of states, including cyber terrorism in the wide spectrum of illegal 
activities occurring in cyber space (Stohl, 2007). According to Imran Awan, however, 
there needs to exist a differentiation between cyber terrorism and cyber crime—a 
necessary distinction to separate the very pressing issue of cyber crime from the yet 
ambiguous concept of cyber terrorism (Awan, 33). Michael Stohl concludes that the 
definition of cyber terrorism needs to align with traditional views of terrorism and defines 
it as, “The purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or 
compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat” (Stohl, 2007). With 
this definition, Stohl maintains the “effects-based” approach but emphasizes that the 
intention behind an attack characterizes it as an act of cyber terrorism (Stohl, 2007). In a 
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services in 2000, Dorothy Denning defined 
cyber terrorism as, “the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace” (Denning, 2000, 1). 
Like Stohl, she stresses that, “to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. 
Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water 
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contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against 
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. 
Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not” 
(1). All of these different definitions solidify the question whether cyber terrorism poses a 
real threat to governments. 
 While scholars are aware of the organizational uses of cyberspace as described by 
Timothy Thomas and Gabriel Weimann, they are more skeptical about the existence of 
cyber terrorism based on Denning’s definition. In fact, Michael Stohl argues that cyber 
terrorist attacks with severe outcomes have not yet occurred (Stohl, 2007). Even though 
Denning mentions several instances in which politically motivated hackers have caused 
severe financial and material damage in the past, she acknowledges that the concept of 
cyber terrorism is “mainly theoretical,” as none of the attacks have caused any physical 
harm to civilians” (Henning, 1-2). However, she speaks of infrastructural vulnerabilities 
terrorists, if acquiring the technical knowledge, could potentially use to their advantage. 
This speculative view of cyber terrorism is what Imran Awan calls the “Doomsday 
Scenario,” according to which terrorists would employ cyber technology to cause 
airplane crashes or to take charge of missiles and bombs (Awan, 24). Despite the 
speculation about terrorists’ technological capabilities in cyberspace and the threats 
against which states are vulnerable, the Internet seems to have great value to national 
security. At the very least, scholars have argued, the Internet offers terrorists an 
operational structure, which facilitates the execution of attacks in the physical world.  
 Consequently, scholars have engaged in a discussion over how terrorists use the 
Internet. Maura Conway argues that the wide range of uses to which scholars such as 
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Fred Cohen (2002), Timothy L. Thomas (2003), or Gabriel Weimann (2004) have 
referred fall under five overarching categories: “information provision, financing, 
networking, recruitment, and information gathering” (Conway, 2005, 3). In some 
respects, these uses of cyberspace by terrorists seem to align with the ways in which other 
non-state actors such as hackers and criminals operate. While cyber crime has existed in 
the form of malicious activity such as identity theft or the disrupting of governmental and 
corporate networks, cyber terrorism can appear in similar actions that are motivated by 
political or ideological agendas.  In this context, terrorists have also employed the 
Internet for propaganda, networking, recruiting, and training of new members. Websites 
of extremist groups contain messages, forums, and videos furthering the cause of their 
political beliefs. While these uses of cyberspace do not directly represent terrorist acts, 
they are closely linked to the organizational structure and execution of terrorist acts in the 
physical world (Awan, 23-31). There exist, however, more direct ways in which terrorists 
can employ cyberspace for the execution of terrorist acts. During the September 11 
attacks, for instance, terrorists used encrypted messages to communicate with each other, 
laying the foundation for their attacks (Awan, 28). In recent years, the concern over direct 
terrorist attacks through cyberspace has grown in the intelligence community. While 
hackers without political agendas have managed to disrupt infrastructures or corporate 
networks in the past, the British intelligence agencies, for example, have voiced their 
concern over a rise of terrorism through similar cyber attacks (Awan, 21). 
The main concern of the intelligence community is what Timothy Thomas calls 
“cyberplanning”—“the digital coordination of an integrated plan stretching across 
geographical boundaries that may or may not result in bloodshed. It can include 
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cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan” (Thomas, 2003, 113). This definition pertains 
especially to the organizational means of Internet services. Conway’s five uses broadly 
categorize instances of cyberplanning. Information provision includes the spread of 
messages to a broad audience that may serve propaganda purposes or even psychological 
warfare, instilling fear of the capabilities of terrorist organizations (5). The videotaped 
executions of Nick Berg and Daniel Pearl in the early 2000s are two examples (5). The 
spread of messages usually takes place through websites affiliated with extremist groups. 
These websites often provide opportunities for fundraising as well: they target specific 
visitors and potential donors through encrypted messages (6). In some cases, extremists 
attract unknowing donors through fake websites of charities that claim to follow peaceful 
intentions (Thomas, 2003, 116). In this way, much of the funding systems remain 
invisible to intelligence agencies.  
Terrorists employ similar techniques to recruit new members (117). As 
propaganda occurs in a public manner, potential members may become attracted to 
extremist views. With regards to networking, Conway observes that the use of online 
communication is causing the decline of hierarchical structures within terrorist 
organizations: sophisticated undercover communication systems enable the 
decentralization of power and a shift towards network-like power structures (Conway, 
10-11).  
While terrorist communication remains mostly unnoticed, extremists make use of 
publicly available information: in 2003, “Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld observed 
that an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan said, ‘Using public sources 
and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all 
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information required about the enemy’” (Thomas, 118). This information may include 
infrastructural or architectural features of potential targets, as demonstrated by an al 
Qaeda computer containing information of a dam with which engineers could plan a 
possible attack more efficiently (118).  
All of these uses facilitate the coordination of terrorist attacks in the physical 
world and incentivize governments to establish measures to gain valuable information on 
terrorist activity. Yet, these uses merely represent indirect links to terrorist attacks. As 
argued by most scholars, cyberspace does not yet pose a security threat in itself. The 
answer to the question whether there is a need for surveillance or not, therefore, depends 
on interpretations, values, and psychological effects the perceived threat of cyber 
terrorism imposes on administrations and how these factors manifest themselves in the 
institutional and legal structures of national security. However, the NSA scandal has 
indicated an exaggeration of security measures in the United States and shows the 
currently imbalanced and inefficient approach to governing cyberspace. 
As a consequence, states apply pre-existing, traditional perceptions of power and 
sovereignty and values in international security onto a space that requires a redefinition 
of these terms. The transatlantic relationship, German-American relations in particular, 
have solidified this dichotomy. The evolution of German foreign policy—Germany’s 
reemergence from a semi-sovereign status to a major actor in international security—and 
its close link to American security policy outlines the pre-existing perceptions of 
sovereignty and power that incentivized the construction of sovereignty in cyberspace. 
The clash of identities and values in the German-American case exemplifies the 
impossibility of the traditional exercise of power in cyberspace.  
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3. The Evolution of German Foreign Policy 
The Way to Sovereignty 
 In August 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany held its first elections. With 
Theodor Heuss as the federal president and Konrad Adenauer as the first chancellor, the 
elections marked a first step towards autonomy. This first step, however, came along with 
a set of conditions: the Allies would maintain jurisdiction through an occupation statute, 
which granted them control particularly on the foreign and security policy front 
(Haftendorn, 2006, 15). On September 21, 1949, representatives of the allied states came 
together in Bonn to present the occupation statute to Adenauer. The planned formality of 
this ceremony and its actual outcome symbolized the integration process of the Federal 
Republic into the West (Haftendorn, 14). While the commissioners had restricted 
Adenauer from joining them on the red carpet before the chairman’s official declaration 
of the statute, the chancellor skillfully bypassed this rule, as he recounts: “I went up to the 
Petersberg in the company of a few federal ministers. We were led into a room where we 
were received by the three High Commissioners standing on a carpet. Francois-Poncet 
was chairman that day. While I stopped in front of the carpet he took one step forward to 
greet me. I saw my opportunity, went towards him and thus stood on the carpet myself. 
None of the High Commissioners objected. Francois-Poncet gave his speech” 
(Haftendorn, 15). Adenauer’s account represents the larger picture of German integration 
into the West; the idea that the allies would cease formal provisions within the context of 
reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, and common security objectives.  
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The reemergence of Germany as an autonomous actor in international security 
has, therefore, largely been an extending of its scope of action with regards to Europe and 
the United States. The end of World War II and the founding of a West German state in 
1949 represented the beginnings of a “Road to Europe” on the one hand and the 
establishment of an “Atlantic Alliance” on the other (Haftendorn, 83). The regaining of 
sovereignty seems to have paralleled these two processes, taking place under foreign 
supervision and marked by various key events leading up to reunification in 1990. The 
presentation of the occupation statute to representatives of the Federal Republic implied 
that, despite the founding of a new German state, the nation had not regained sovereignty 
immediately after the war (Haftendorn, 14). German rearmament eventually indicated a 
first step towards sovereignty. The question of rearmament solidified differing goals and 
priorities for the parties involved: for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, rearmament meant a 
basis for sovereignty, counterbalancing armament in the East, and an institutionalization 
of European military forces. Cautious about a potential rise of Germany as a major 
military power, France objected to Germany’s entry into the NATO. The United States, 
pushing for this entry, sought to strengthen Europe’s military force and eventually 
reached a compromise for Germany to contribute outside of the NATO realm 
(Haftendorn, 23, 26). This compromise between national and international interests in the 
establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty of 1952 demonstrated 
that Germany’s recurring pursuit of autonomy could take place only within the context of 
European institutions. This rather self-contradictory fact was enforced in the General 
Treaty of 1955 that initially granted the state its partial sovereignty: the United States, 
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France, and Britain maintained certain rights for influence in Germany and, with them, 
the state’s “semi-sovereign” nature until 1990 (Wittlinger, 13, 2013).  
 The EDC Treaty and the General Treaty lead to opposition on the German 
domestic stage and revealed a general aversion to militarism: the culture of postwar 
German foreign policy was marked by a sense of overcorrection, to counteract the former 
striving for power (Machtversessenheit) through self-restraint and even an ”oblivion of 
power (Machtvergessenheit)” (Wittlinger, 13). This conscious shift in approaching 
foreign affairs contradicted the security needs of the republic’s allies. Germany’s entry 
into the NATO in 1955 further complicated this contradiction. The lack of domestic 
support for rearmament was complemented by an abundance of responsibilities towards a 
variety of critical partners and regions, a dilemma posed by the central location of 
Germany in Europe. NATO membership brought forth three distinct but opposing roles 
that Henning Tewes described as influences on German priorities in international 
security: the “Atlanticist” role emphasized on Germany’s responsibility to enforce U.S. 
security interests while the “Gaullist” approach would prioritize a pivot towards Europe 
(Tewes, 2002, 7). These two objectives intertwined in Germany’s military and economic 
integration into the West (Westbindung). The “Muscovite” role, however, indicated a 
need to refocus foreign policy towards the East, a route taken in Chancellor Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Tewes, 7).  
 
Between Transatlantic Relations and European Integration 
 Germany’s reemergence on the international stage has demonstrated two major 
mechanisms that have resulted in the challenges and opportunities of transatlantic 
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security in the present. First, Europe has become more integrated. As established in the 
previous section, this integration commenced on the foundation of economic and security 
interests and specialized institutions and has now evolved as a broader, overarching 
cultural and political institution. While Germany has gained its full sovereignty, it has 
gained it under the condition of integration. This new interconnectedness comes along 
with mutual responsibilities in the security realm. Second, the integration of Europe and 
full sovereignty of Germany has decreased the functionality of U.S. influence in 
European security affairs (Zimmerman, 2005, 143). While Germany carries emerging 
responsibilities towards European institutions, it has faced the challenge of balancing 
these responsibilities with the interests of its symbolic and historical partnership with the 
United States. This balancing is complicated by the observation that the two mechanisms 
have caused irreconcilable values and priorities in international security between Europe 
and the United States to be more likely to surface. These conditions have intensified the 
diplomatic crisis over NSA surveillance programs. 
 As analysis in Chapter 4 will show, the NSA scandal has confirmed the remaining 
existence of these mechanisms. Even though the Internet poses a security concern for 
both, the United States and European countries, contradicting definitions of threats and 
different priorities have polarized both sides on the issue. While Germany’s security 
priority—the protection of privacy—aligns with the priorities shared with the rest of 
continental Europe, the United States has militarized cyberspace as a response to 
perceived cyber security threats by terrorist groups. The exaggeration of U.S. policies 
pertaining to the regulation of the Internet has continued the trend of conflicts of the last 
two decades that have demonstrated an irreconcilable American exceptionalism in 
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involvement in European security. Before analyzing the diplomatic and policy 
background of this recent scandal, I will expand on the debates on Germany’s foreign 
policy trends and the mechanisms surrounding its relationships with European institutions 
and the United States. This analysis will place the recent cyber surveillance issue within 
the broader context of transatlantic relations and European integration.   
Out of the two mechanisms described above grew several theories about the 
nature of the new unified German state. Debates focused on the ways in which the 
context of intergovernmental institutions, the presence of the past, and national identity 
had shaped Germany’s foreign and security policy objectives. Would Germany take on 
greater responsibilities and how would it prioritize its obligations towards the United 
States and Europe? Were there incentives for a new sense of German exceptionalism? In 
analyzing the reconstruction of post-war Europe, optimists have projected the image of “a 
Germany tamed by international ties” (Markovits; Reich, 1997, 44-45). This conclusion 
is grounded in arguments ranging from Germany’s collective memory and prevention of 
future abuses of power to economic interests in European integration and the 
impossibility of a sustainable balance of power in a disintegrated Europe (44). These 
arguments consider the European Union as an institution constraining the use of power 
and, more importantly, an institution incentivizing Germany to prioritize economic 
growth over relative power.  
While the pessimists acknowledge Germany’s legal obligations to 
intergovernmental institutions, they believe that these multilateral structures serve as a 
new ground for German exercise of power (Markovits; Reich, 50). They argue that the 
introduction of a European-wide currency happened on the terms of German interests: 
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specific requirements on state debt, for instance, suited only the already dominant state of 
the German economy (51). In addition, they refer to a report by CDU / CSU 
parliamentary leader Wolfgang Schäuble who noted that Germany and France were to 
fuel the project of European integration, with all other countries having to adapt to the 
standard of economic progress imposed by the core states (51). The pessimists believe, 
therefore, that the new structural and economic landscape of Europe allows Germany to 
redefine its control over its neighbors—the desire of power still exists and the Federal 
Republic has found new ways of channeling its exercise in peaceful ways (52). Along 
with economic power, the state has increasingly exercised cultural power in Eastern 
Europe, a newly accessible territory for German influence (50). 
In the realm of competing theories in international relations, the perspective of 
Germany as a civilian power had gained increasing popularity leading up to and 
immediately following reunification (Dettke, 2009, 5). Hanns W. Maull, one of the most 
prominent advocates of this theory, referred to the “’civilising’ of international relations,” 
the process by which nations project domestic democratic values onto international 
organizations and regimes (Harnisch; Maull, 2001, 3). The theory is closely linked to 
liberalism—it anticipates the need for regulating individual state sovereignty as states 
increasingly rely on multilateral agreements to protect themselves (Tewes, 10-13). As a 
consequence, it values the creation of interdependent and cooperative security 
communities in which military force serves merely self-defense or the promotion of 
democracy—two concepts that may cause several contradictions (Tewes, 12). This last 
point resolves, however, the commonly held belief that the civilian power paradigm is a 
pacifist one (12). The multilateral approach to security in this argument assumes that a 
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state would forgo national interest or even its sovereignty for the objective of civilizing 
international systems (Maull, 4).  
This process has been, according to its supporters, the driving force behind 
decision-making in German foreign policy. Since reunification, several foreign policy 
issues have been at the center of focus, ranging from Germany’s work on nuclear 
nonproliferation to its stance on Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In general, supporters of 
the civilian power theory such as Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich point to the fact 
that Germany abstained from responsibility in security affairs despite its significant 
economic power, redefining the concept of German exceptionalism (Markovits; Reich, 
1997, 206). The exceptionalism of the Third Reich derived from its exercise of power in 
Europe; the one of the post-war period, on the contrary, marked a willful neglect of 
power and a shifting of responsibility towards the international stage (Markovits; Reich, 
206).  
Markovits and Reich’s argument gains significance particularly with regards to 
the early stages of German militarism after unification. The question of German 
involvement in the First Gulf War brought forth several contradictions in the nation’s use 
of force and its relationships with its allies. Nina Philippi points out that Germany, 
focusing on growing the economy of the unified state, had not yet acknowledged the rise 
of new types of security challenges after the fall of the Soviet Union. The idea of smaller 
military operations had been undermined by the fear of another world war, leading 
foreign policy experts to condemn the use of force in Iraq (Philippi, 2001, 50-51). At the 
same time, the voices against the Gulf War on the domestic front were mainly targeted at 
the international community and meant to establish Germany’s open aversion to military 
 27 
use (51). Even though nations such as Israel and France had previously feared and 
opposed German rearmament, they now condemned the state’s passiveness in Iraq and 
questioned its commitment to the security community (52). Philippi argues that especially 
Germany’s opposition against military use in Iraq and general hesitation leading up to 
Kosovo complicated Hanns Maull’s depiction of Germany as a civilian power (63f.). In 
reference to Germany’s secondary role in Western security affairs, she argues that, “an 
ideal type Civilian Power would not always stand in the second row but be a global 
player who actively tries to foster its civilising tasks . . . The ‘power-element’ within the 
Civilian Power model is therefore underdeveloped” (65).  
The debate over the Gulf War in 1990-91, therefore, demonstrated the 
contradiction within the civilian power stance for Germany: cooperation often 
contradicted domestic values regarding security and Germany’s integration into 
international organizations would be complicated through the changing security demands 
of the international community. The Gulf War case also demonstrated a shift in 
international expectations. Philippi’s argument shows that the reconciliation of World 
War II could not occur simply through German pacifism and a commitment to self-
defense in the realm of NATO. Instead, Germany was increasingly expected to match its 
economic power in security matters, an observation that aligns with Markovits and 
Reich’s statement on a new German exceptionalism. Rather than holding on to a pacifist 
stance, Germany would have to reconcile its past through a commitment to its allies’ 
security objectives, regardless if this commitment came in the form of military 
contribution. Germany’s reemergence as an actor in international security consequently 
required the adaptation to a new international order and a redefinition of how the nation 
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would reconcile its past. These changes meant that the administrations had to undermine 
existing cultural values and overcome contradictions on the domestic front to effectively 
integrate into a cooperative security community. 
Despite these challenges in German foreign policy, supporters of the Civilian 
Power model applied their theory to interpret the nation’s decisions in international 
security. Henning Tewes, for instance, argues that NATO enlargement in 1994 
exemplified a case of German civilian power: the administration supported the inclusion 
of Eastern European states into NATO under the condition that it would not impair 
Germany’s relationship with Russia (Tewes, 2001, 19). The spread of democracy 
presented the main incentive for enlargement, demonstrating the nation’s interest in 
incorporating its democratic values in intergovernmental organizations (19). This careful 
consideration of both cooperation with Russia and broadening the scope of NATO as not 
only a security but also democratic community seemed to highlight Germany’s role as a 
civilian power (20). However, this rather cautious approach can also be interpreted as a 
balancing of conflicting national and international interest and an internal debate over 
Germany’s identity in security affairs. The enlargement of NATO represented further 
integration of security ties in Europe—an idea the United States generally supported. The 
acknowledgment of cooperation with Russia, which was grounded in economic interests, 
showed the dichotomy of Germany’s simultaneous reemergence in the global economy 
and international security. The civilian power model, in this case, relies too heavily on 
the idea of sacrifice for the sake of integration and cooperation. It overlooks the idea that 
conflicting economic and security interests shaped the contemplation over NATO 
enlargement.   
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The contradictions brought forth during the period of the First Gulf War and 
NATO Enlargement debate manifested in the question on a normalization of German 
power. The civilian power perspective had dominated this question—its link to liberalism 
and support of the idea that Germany would not follow its national interest in security 
affairs lead observers to believe in a remaining German exceptionalism. Germany’s 
pacifism and unwillingness to take on greater responsibilities only perpetuated the view 
that Germany had not been normalized. The false interpretations of the civilian power 
model as a pacifist one made it seem irreconcilable with normalization.  
Military intervention in Kosovo posed a first step to reconciling this conflict. 
While critics argued that German military intervention in Kosovo was a reaction to 
outside forces—the United States had pressured the newly elected administration under 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer into a quick 
decision—Hanns Maull attributes German involvement to a combination of domestic and 
international forces. While international expectations did pressure Germany into taking 
action, the administration had its own agenda in making a decision in favor of the use of 
force (Maull, 2001, 118). First, Germany had an interest in maintaining the legitimacy of 
the international institutions involved. Having learned from the experience of the first 
Gulf War and since developed an open-mindedness for military force, the German public 
increasingly accepted Germany’s commitment to NATO, the EU, and the UN through the 
use of force; a development that gave Schröder and Fischer the domestic support to act 
instantly (Maull, 117). Second, Maull argues that “deeply held beliefs and norms” about 
Germany’s responsibility to prevent further genocides made intervention in Kosovo 
indispensible (118). He concludes that, despite the shift towards military use, Germany 
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strengthened its positions as a civilian power as it projected its democratic values onto 
cooperation within international institutions (120).  
Maull’s reliance on underlying norms and values becomes problematic in light of 
the inconsistency in German foreign policy decisions. Following Germany’s abstention to 
provide military aid to Libya, The Economist published an article titled “The 
unadventurous eagle” in 2011, noting that the central European country was alienating 
itself from its traditional allies in Europe and across the Atlantic. The author argued that 
the nation entered a new trend of following German exceptionalism, no longer being 
invested in its multilateral agreements and former partnerships. Hanns Maull contributed 
with the observation that Germany lacked a “grand strategy” (Economist, 2011). Since 
this alienation posed an issue since the first Gulf War, it is arguable that the concept of 
German exceptionalism is a recent development. Yet, the inconsistencies in foreign 
policy decisions seem to support the idea of exceptionalism and complicate the civilian 
power model. If Germany were still or had ever been a civilian power, would it not have 
developed a clear “grand strategy”? In fact, the civilian power paradigm represents a 
grand strategy in itself. Germany’s inconsistencies, therefore, prove the theory as 
insufficient in fully explaining the nation’s foreign policy behavior.  
 
Normalization, Sovereignty, and Transatlantic Relations 
 The civilian power theory had persisted throughout the postwar period and the 
first decade after unification because German values and public interest largely aligned 
with the integration into the West and development of multilateral agreements. 
Germany’s recent alienation from its allies has revived arguments of a special path and 
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the country’s inability to form long-term alliances. To some, however, this alienation 
does not represent a special path for Germany. Instead, it renders support to the idea that 
Germany has become a normal power.  
 Normalization in international affairs, specifically in the case of Germany, has 
been subject of change and multiple different definitions (Dettke, 21). Since the end of 
the Second World War, international expectations of German reconciliation have put the 
issues of reparations and responsibility for war crimes at the center of normalization. In 
this context, normalization required reconciliation with Germany’s neighboring countries, 
former Soviet nations, and the support of the autonomy of Israel. According to Dieter 
Dettke, reconciliation was a problematic definition for normalization: while Germany 
demonstrated its willingness and efforts for reconciliation through reparations and 
compensation programs, the insufficiency of these concessions to reconcile the past 
would indicate that Germany would “remain imprisoned in its past” (21). Even the idea 
of pacifism did not provide an adequate moral standard for reconciliation as both military 
actions as well as inaction entail ethical problems (21). The evaluation of normalcy, 
therefore, had to reach beyond the complicated boundaries of reconciliation.   
 As post-war Germany was a semi-sovereign state, the regaining of sovereignty 
and reemergence as an autonomous actor in international relations play a significant role 
in defining normalization. Germany’s and particularly Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s 
campaign against the Iraq War in 2002-03 has become a major point of contention with 
regards to this reemergence. Some projected the Civilian Power model onto the decision 
to abstain from the use of force in Iraq—the decision demonstrated the country’s 
hesitation regarding out-of-area operations and reconfirmed its striving for a special path 
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and a commitment to pacifism (Zimmermann, 2005, 128). Germany’s goal of building a 
coalition in the U.N. Security Council that would serve as a counterbalance to American 
influence seemed to support this perspective. However, Dieter Dettke argues that the 
stance taken by Chancellor Schroeder’s administration was rooted in the principle of 
following national interest and autonomy (Dettke, 7).  
While many realist scholars saw the German-American tension over Iraq as a 
long-lasting division between German and American security policy, Dettke argues that 
based on modern realism, particularly defensive structural realism, Germany’s more 
aggressive behavior in following its national interest does not necessarily imply a 
structural alienation from the United States or Europe. Instead, it “anticipates that hard-
line policies focusing on political and military competition lead to self-defeating 
consequences” (Dettke, 14). This argumentation implies that nations maximize on their 
ability to enforce their own policies but acknowledge the limits presented to them by the 
structures of power and multilateral agreements. The debate over German normalcy thus 
also includes the question whether normalization would mean the end of German-
American relations or German-European relations as they have existed since the end of 
World War II.  
Other evaluations of normalcy focus on policy-interests and the specific roles 
states take on to exercise these interests. Hubert Zimmerman, for instance, argues that 
Germany’s reemergence on the international stage has brought forth a new dynamic in 
German-American relations:  
“To an extent unprecedented in the postwar era, Germany and the United States 
now pursue structurally similar international policies. Since the end of the Cold 
War, Germany has become an exporter of security abroad, whereas previously it 
had been an importer of security from the United States. Thus the fundamental 
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policy objectives and policy tools of the United States and Germany in the 
international system are becoming more alike, as both seek to address security 
threats by intervening abroad – politically, economically, and militarily” 
(Zimmermann, 129).  
 
This theory relies on a historical evaluation of the evolution of German foreign 
policy. The global power structure in the post-war era caused the necessity and, 
consequently, the acceptance of American hegemony in security policy in Europe. The 
counterbalancing of Soviet power, in Zimmermann’s terms, represented a “burden-
sharing” that exceeded the boundaries of international security—it pertained to the 
economic, political, and arguably the cultural development of the Western alliance. The 
concept of “importing” or “consuming” security is based on a business-related model that 
indicates an exchange of security and protection on the one hand, and an 
acknowledgment of leadership and long-term hegemony on the other. The factor of 
sovereignty plays an important role in this exchange. The acknowledgment of U.S. 
hegemony specifically in Germany represented an acknowledgment of the semi-
sovereign nature of the West-German state. American hegemony meant military presence 
in Germany and throughout Europe and special rights of oversight of German foreign and 
domestic policy by the allies. While this oversight, as previously discussed, decreased in 
formality, it remained in the way of a complete reemergence—or normalization—of 
German foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, which arguably marked the end of 
the European need for American protection. Accordingly, for as long as Germany 
remained an “importer of security,” sovereignty was dispensable—the business model 
presented a fair solution to the “burden-sharing” in the West.  
Zimmermann’s theory also suggests that normalcy is measurable by the degree to 
which a country’s policy interests and their enforcement align with the general foreign 
 34 
policy behavior and consensus of other states within its alliance. In the case of Germany, 
Zimmermann refers to its use of military force in the Kosovo War; a decision that marked 
the beginning or a first major test of Germanys “exporter role” in international security, 
though preceded by several smaller steps of intervention and stabilizing measures in the 
area (141). Over the years, Zimmermann argues, the European Union had played a key 
role in stabilizing Eastern Europe with the export of security to Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia, resulting in a transformative foreign policy role for the union as a whole 
(141). Germany showed its leadership in providing stability in these particular regions 
despite the rather limiting perspective of the civilian power theory. Zimmermann 
concludes that Europe’s and Germany’s leadership in Eastern Europe has transformed the 
role not only of Europe but also of the United States: if more European countries 
demonstrate their capacity to provide stability, “the functional basis for asymmetrical US 
leadership of the Atlantic partnership is gone” (143).  
These observations suggest that the transatlantic relationship finds itself in a 
transitional phase in which European powers, including Germany, have achieved 
normalcy through “exporting” stability. The challenge of this transitional phase, 
according to David Andrews, is a newly gained sense of freedom by which the United 
States determines its actions. During the Cold War, the constant threat of the Soviet 
Union required a unified counterbalance of power in the West. Even though the United 
States took on the leadership role of exporting security to Europe, it relied on the support 
of European states in security affairs. The crisis in transatlantic relations of the last 
decade, initiated by the War on Terror and the Iraq War in 2002, has demonstrated that 
the United States no longer depends on long-term support from its European allies 
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(Andrews, 2005, 69). At the time the United States began its course of fighting terrorism 
and lobbying for international support, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
spoke of “’floating coalitions of countries’” and stated that, “’the mission will define the 
coalition – not the other way around’” (Zimmermann, 144). With this statement, he 
contrasted the current constellation of U.S. allies with the long-term partnership that was 
once formed for a common overarching goal. The statement also shows the willingness of 
the United States to act upon the newly gained freedom of building short-term coalitions 
and even face the risk of enforcing national interest by itself. Addressing the recent 
surveillance scandal, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore refer to the United States as a 
“hypocritical hegemon” whose policies have often been tolerated and legitimized because 
of the international system and values it has generated in the last century (Farrell, 
Finnemore, 2013, 2). Hypocrisy, in this context, has been an essential tool for the United 
States to operate within this system (2). This argument confirms the idea that the United 
States can no longer rely on support from its allies based on its higher moral ground. 
Instead, there needs to exist a real incentive for cooperation between the U.S. and its 
allies who decreasingly “benefit from the global public goods Washington provides” (3). 
The transitional phase of the transatlantic relationship is consequently characterized by a 
disconnect between the lack of functionality of U.S. influence on European security 
policy and the sense of freedom of the United States to enforce its policy interests in 
short-term coalitions.  
The cyber surveillance scandal and the relatively new challenge of cyber security 
have confirmed the existence of this disconnect. While states—including Germany—
have an interest in using cyberspace as a means of security, there is a lack of equality in 
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determining the extent to which they should regulate and control data. Additionally, 
direct threats in cyberspace—especially terrorist-related attacks—have not yet been as 
pronounced to incentivize and legitimize the degree of protective measures the United 
States has implemented. Having put these surveillance programs in place, however, the 
United States has acted upon its ability to follow its national security interests without 
seeking long-term coalitions. The lack of transparency in cyberspace has facilitated this 
process. Regardless of the extent to which other states such as Germany were aware of 
the program, the United States has acquired the technological capacity to establish its 
hegemony in a shared space. 
The business model of importing security and acknowledging hegemony therefore 
no longer adequately addresses the circumstances of power and roles from a European 
perspective. The scandal has brought forth clear objectives and values European states, 
especially Germany, are aiming to project onto their regulation of cyberspace. 
Sovereignty, with regard to cyber surveillance, manifests itself not only in the control of 
data but also in the degree to which states can enforce their values onto regulation of the 
Internet. The United States has, in Farrell and Finnemore’s terms, exercised its 
sovereignty by enforcing its values in international security in a yet relatively unregulated 
and largely undivided space and thereby undermined the sovereignty of others. In this 
case, however, strongly held values and sensibility regarding privacy and data protection 
make the exchange between sovereignty and protection too costly.  
With regard to normalization, the cyber surveillance case has solidified the idea 
that German normalization—a more leveled playing ground in international security—is 
inevitably linked to the United States. The mechanism of Germany’s reemergence as an 
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autonomous actor and simultaneous decline of American influence on its security policy 
implies a remaining German dependence on the United States: even though Germany has 
reestablished itself as an “exporter of security,” and taken on new roles and 
responsibilities since reunification, the United States has maintained its expectation of the 
transatlantic relationship—that it provides security for the price of hegemony. The final 
step in German normalization consequently depends on a redefinition of the role of the 
United States in transatlantic security. In the following chapter, I will analyze how the 
new dilemma of sovereignty and American hegemony in transatlantic relations has 
revealed itself in the diplomacy- and policy-related issues of the NSA scandal. 
 
 
4. Germany and Cyber Security 
A Symbolic Scandal 
When Edward Snowden leaked information on surveillance programs conducted 
by the NSA in 2013, the transatlantic relationship was already facing several ongoing 
challenges. The scandal threatened to interrupt ongoing and already contentious talks on 
a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union called the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As the United States and 
Germany had previously experienced tension over German military action in Libya, to 
which the German government abstained despite pressure from both the United States 
and Europe, they now faced a similar situation with regards to Syria. U.S. Secretary of 
State John Kerry and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle disagreed on the 
question of providing arms to Syrian rebels, with Mr. Westerwelle remaining cautious 
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and suggesting to follow the course of the conflict. Despite their collaborative diplomatic 
measures against the Russian government, which stood in the way of peace talks in Syria, 
their disagreement added to the recurring tension in transatlantic cooperation in 
international security. On top of these points of contention, which had occurred in a long 
string of events leading to alienation on both sides, the summer of 2013 was of historic 
and symbolic significance—it marked the 50th anniversary of President Kennedy’s 
speech in Berlin in 1963. In commemoration of the speech that most explicitly tied the 
people of Berlin and Germany as a whole to the guiding values and worldview of the 
United States, President Obama was invited to speak in Berlin in June 2013.  
In the midst of all these circumstances, the surveillance scandal combined several 
significant facets and layers of contention in German-American relations and solidified 
core issues pertaining to cultural and political values, economic aspects, and the question 
of leadership in security affairs. Even though cyber surveillance and data privacy will 
continuously impose an important policy challenge on these countries, the NSA scandal 
by itself appeared first and foremost as a symbolic scandal, representing deeper 
fundamental challenges to be overcome in the future. The progression of the scandal—
the interaction between different levels on the German domestic front and their changing 
reactions to the revelations—has demonstrated this observation. The neutrality and 
silence of Merkel’s administration contradicted the public outrage at first. Having relied 
on rather symbolic acts of investigating the issue, the administration showed a stronger 
stance when the scandal pertained to Chancellor Merkel herself. The tapping of her 
phone—even though not significantly adding to the scope of NSA spying—reinforced 
and intensified the symbolic image of Germany as a subject of security. While public 
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concern about Germany’s involvement in cyber surveillance showed its aversion to 
Germany as a major actor in international security, Merkel’s outrage over the image of a 
subject of security solidified a contradiction in priorities between public and government 
interest. The progression of the scandal, therefore, highlighted symbolic representations 
of pacifism within the German public on the one hand, and the desire of the government 
for more autonomy and trust in security affairs on the other.  
The revelation of NSA spying in the summer of 2013 brought forth strong 
reactions across the entire political spectrum in Germany. As newspapers reported, 
Germany was the main target of the NSA, creating a rift of trust in the transatlantic 
relationship (DW, 2013). Taking place in the middle of political campaigns for the 
federal elections in September, the issue became highly politicized. Initial reactions 
seemed to solidify the common stance that Germany had the responsibility to investigate 
the issue. Some officials even suggested imposing pressure on the U.S. administration by 
pausing talks regarding a new transatlantic trade agreement or refusing to pass along 
passenger information of flights headed towards the United States (Zeit, 2013). Others 
pleaded for German and European support for Edward Snowden and introduced the idea 
of granting him asylum in Germany. They referred to the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe who had preexisting regulations on the support of whistleblowers (DW, Spiegel, 
2013).  
 Despite all these reactions, Chancellor Angela Merkel seemed to avoid the topic 
altogether and hesitated to take a stance in the issue. Instead of confronting the Obama 
administration, she sent representatives to the United States to investigate the degree to 
which the NSA spied on German citizens, the government, and private corporations. In 
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mid-July, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich of the Christian Social Union (CSU) met 
with U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden, Attorney General Eric Holder, and chief counter-
terrorism advisor Lisa Monaco. He stated that the U.S. representatives acknowledged the 
German need for privacy and increased transparency in the surveillance process between 
the two governments. To enable further cooperation, the NSA would begin a 
“declassification process.” Additionally, Friedrich was assured that the U.S. was not 
engaging in economic espionage. The interior minister concluded that the NSA 
surveillance program is quite focused on targeting specific data on terrorist attacks, 
organized crime, and non-proliferation. As a response to the minister’s optimistic report 
of his meeting, the opposition criticized his diplomatic approach. Stating that the meeting 
did not meet the expectation of receiving detailed information on the surveillance 
program, the SPD and the Greens characterized it as a mere attempt to showcase concern 
(DW, 2013). Friedrich’s visit turned into a highly politicized event, employed by the 
opposition to accuse the Chancellor and her party for downplaying the scandal.  
 Similar accusations followed a hearing with Merkel’s Chief of Staff Ronald 
Pofalla in front of the intelligence committee at the end of July. The committee chairman 
concluded that the hearing had not resulted in any progress. Statements by Pofalla rather 
complicated the declassification process, which other government officials demanded. 
According to Pofalla, the German intelligence community had not been involved in NSA 
spying and he assured that, with regards to cyber security, the secret service had 
exercised within the realm of the German legal system (DW, 2013). This statement 
seemed to downplay the capabilities of the German foreign intelligence service, the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which is one of the few of its kind in the world that, 
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according to a Spiegel article in June 2013, had invested in information technology for 
surveillance purposes. The article suggested that greater control of Internet activities has 
become one of the major priorities of Gerhard Schindler, the head of the BND who 
announced in 2012 a plan to invest 133 million dollars in the surveillance department 
(Spiegel, 2013). Interior Minister Friedrich supported this plan by emphasizing the need 
for a presence of German authorities in cyberspace and the opportunities the Internet 
entails for criminals. These goals in the intelligence community demonstrated a lack of 
technological capacity rather than a lack of incentive: even though legally cleared to 
collect 20 percent of data from foreign Internet traffic, the BND supposedly had the 
capacity to regulate only a much smaller percentage (Spiegel, 2013).  
Regardless of the extent to which the government collaborated with the NSA on 
its surveillance program, the existence of surveillance measures on a smaller scale 
through programs at the German foreign intelligence service (BND) showcase the 
German government’s interest in or even security need for surveillance of cyberspace. 
The legal and technological limitations of the BND, however, indicate that Germany 
could not achieve sufficient regulation of the Internet by itself. Consequently, a gap 
existed and still exists between security needs and the measures that could possibly be 
enacted; a gap possibly filled by U.S. intelligence. Since revelations about Prism began, 
U.S. officials have released several reports regarding the number of terrorist attacks 
prevented through the collection of data. In a hearing in front of the House of 
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of the NSA General Keith 
Alexander reported that the analysis of data through NSA surveillance had prevented 50 
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potential terrorist attacks globally since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (DW, 
2013). Several of these attacks were supposedly prevented on German soil. 
Individual reports also suggested cooperation on an EU-wide level: according to 
information gathered by the Financial Times, representatives of the Obama 
administration had lobbied for a loosening of privacy laws in Europe (FT, 2013). The 
lobbying efforts targeted the “anti-Fisa clause,” which would have arguably restricted 
NSA spying on European citizens (FT). This clause, in addition to the silence of the 
government, raised suspicions among German citizens: according to a poll at the time, 87 
percent believed that German security agencies had been aware of the NSA spying 
program while over three quarters also suspected that the government had been involved 
(SZ, 2013). What supported these suspicions was the relative silence of the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) despite its leadership role in the opposition. Since 
the NSA program was said to date back to the time the previous administration was in 
place, a coalition government between the SPD and Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
critics would have traced back policies to former and current SPD leaders. In fact, the 
SPD supported surveillance-related policies in 2005, resulting in Chancellor candidate 
Peer Steinbrück remaining silent about the scandal (DW, 2013).  
Chancellor Merkel reiterated General Alexander’s argument about the need for 
surveillance throughout the beginning phase of the scandal (Zeit, 2013). Her initial 
defense of NSA surveillance demonstrated her acknowledgment of American hegemony 
on the one hand, and the need to convey a functional value of American protection on the 
other. As debates over the legal aspects of cyber surveillance surfaced and suspicion 
about a possible cooperation increased, public reactions dismissed the idea of American 
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protection and prioritized German security interests in cyberspace—the protection of 
privacy. At a moment in which the scope of NSA spying was quite ambiguous, the 
Chancellor was more open to the idea of balancing German and American interests 
through a balance between security and civil liberties. Since only symbolic actions were 
taken and investigations of the issue delayed, the initial reaction of Ms. Merkel’s 
administration suggested that there still exists a certain degree of acceptance of and 
interest in American protection. 
The major policy debate regarding the scandal revolved around the appropriate 
balance between security and privacy. This debate took place specifically in the United 
States as the government had to address the specific concerns about security threats and 
their implications for privacy in cyberspace. For Chancellor Merkel, however, the 
contradiction in policy interests also pertained to domestic affairs, the upcoming federal 
election, and Germany’s relationship with the United States. While President Obama’s 
administration faced the task of balancing security and privacy, Merkel’s initial obstacle 
was the balance between maintaining the transatlantic relationship and satisfying the 
public’s expectation of a strong German stance in the issue. At the beginning of the 
scandal, she remained in the background of negotiating this balance. Having 
acknowledged the need for privacy, she emphasized transatlantic cooperation in cyber 
surveillance for the security of German citizens. In an interview with Die Zeit, she 
defended the idea of cyber surveillance, stressing that the regulation and security of 
cyberspace are parallel concepts. The balance between security and privacy should be an 
ongoing debate, as technological capacities and the security needs of the state constantly 
change. In this context, it would be inescapable that the intelligence services of different 
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governments collaborate to exchange information. Her major point behind backing 
security measures in the Internet was her reminder that the United States has been 
Germany’s closest ally, and that German unification had come along with a relationship 
of trust and cooperation in security affairs (Zeit, 2013). She rejected parallels of the NSA 
with the East German Stasi, stressing that such comparisons understated the severity of 
Stasi operations (Zeit, 2013).  
Interior Minister Friedrich took a similar stance on the topic: in an interview with 
Spiegel leading up to his visit to Washington, he assured the public of his plans to voice 
the privacy concerns but highlighted that anti-American sentiments were “unfair” due to 
the lack of information on the NSA operations (Spiegel, 2013). His approach to the 
meeting relied on his trust in the transatlantic partnership as he expected an open 
conversation “among friends;” referring to a long-standing cooperative relationship that 
would have to prove itself in the coming weeks and months (Spiegel). He rather avoided 
the question on NSA spying in EU affiliated institutions and redirected the focus towards 
the lack of evidence and significance of cooperation between the United States and 
Germany. Both Merkel and Friedrich, therefore, maintained quite passive and reconciling 
voices as media coverage, criticism from the opposition, and public outrage unfolded 
throughout the weeks.  
Their statements also reflect the historical component and how pre-existing 
perceptions of German autonomy vis-à-vis the United States were projected onto cyber 
security. The symbolism of the transatlantic relationship and the upcoming 50
th
 
anniversary celebration of President Kennedy’s Berlin speech provided an incentive for 
neutrality and patience. By rejecting comparisons between the NSA and the Stasi and by 
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reinforcing the value of German-American relations not only in security affairs but also 
in the evolution of German sovereignty, Merkel drew attention to a part of German 
history that seems to polarize public opinion. Table 1 shows the results of a poll by the 
German Marshall Fund following the scandal. The survey seeks to capture European and 
American views on future cooperation or independence in security affairs (Stelzenmüller; 
Raicher, 2013). 44 percent of Germans surveyed believed that Germany should distance 
itself from the United States and take a more independent approach to security policy. 
While only 15 percent answered in favor of closer collaboration, a third of the surveyed 
stated the balance between independence and collaboration should remain about the 
same. This outcome shows the polarization of opinions on U.S. foreign policy in 
Germany, which is supported by the fact that only 7 percent abstained from deciding 
among these three options.  
 
Table 1: Should EU/US partnership in security/diplomacy become closer, remain about the same or should the EU/US 
take a more independent approach from the US/EU? 
 Countries 
  
GB 
 
France 
 
Germany 
 
USA 
 
Sweden 
Unweighted 
Weighted 
1047 
1047 
1051 
1051 
1056 
1056 
1054 
1054 
1017 
1017 
Become Closer 
 
134 
13% 
282 
27% 
159 
15% 
253 
24% 
234 
23% 
Remain about the same 
 
370 
35% 
242 
23% 
355 
34% 
294 
28% 
264 
26% 
Take a more independent  
approach 
275 
26% 
348 
33% 
464 
44% 
239 
23% 
321 
32% 
Don’t know  
 
268 
26% 
179 
17% 
78 
7% 
268 
25% 
198 
19% 
Adopted from Stelzenmüller/Raicher, GMF (2013) 
 
The polarization also reflects Germany’s unique position within the European Union. A 
stronger tendency towards a more independent approach implies a desire for more 
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autonomy and the incentive to use the new security realm of cyberspace to exercise more 
power and dissolve the current power structures in transatlantic relations. 
The mechanism of European integration, however, revealed the limitations of 
Germany’s scope of action. As public opinion showed the willingness for more 
autonomy, Chancellor Merkel’s pleading for international cooperation and shifting of the 
debate onto the European level demonstrates the state’s dependence on the European 
Union to achieve its security objectives (SZ, 2013). As the scandal had revolved around 
the contentious German-American relationship, Merkel managed to overcome this 
pressure by charging the European Union with more responsibility regarding data 
protection. This strategic shift represented an opportunity to demonstrate German 
leadership in Europe on the one hand, and the interrelatedness between German-
American and European-American relations on the other. At the same time, the shift 
towards the European Union confirms that European integration serves as a 
counterbalance to American hegemony. Even though Germany is seeking a more active 
role in transatlantic security, this role seems to require the legitimization through working 
within the boundaries of European institutions. Accordingly, Chancellor Merkel’s 
administration refused to take on an exceptional role in the scandal by, for instance, 
inviting Snowden to testify on NSA surveillance. This hesitation contradicts the 
exceptional role Germany played as the major target of the surveillance program, which 
would have legitimized a more active investigation. 
Revelations of the tapping of Angela Merkel’s private and official cell phones 
released in October 2013, despite the ambiguity of the sources at the time, dramatically 
ceased the German government’s reconciliation efforts. Having reinforced the need for 
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surveillance for security purposes during President Obama’s visit, Chancellor Merkel and 
other officials openly voiced their doubt in the current state of the transatlantic 
relationship (NYT, 2013). While Ms. Merkel had previously joked about not being aware 
of being the victim of spying herself, she now confronted the U.S. President regarding the 
allegations just a few months later. Her sudden shift in responding to the scandal and 
taking initiative resulted in criticism from the German public and her opposition; a minor 
challenge that emerged after her successful reelection as Chancellor. The change in tone 
also raised the question why Ms. Merkel chose to react specifically at this point. Critics 
argued that the unlawfulness of NSA spying had been proven months before, when the 
media first revealed the content of Edward Snowden’s documents. 
The shift in Ms. Merkel’s stance originated from the symbolic value the new 
revelations held to Germany’s autonomy as an actor in international security. The 
investment in surveillance programs through the BND demonstrated Germany’s 
acknowledgment of security threats in the Internet. Since the BND lacked the 
technological capacity of implementing a sufficient regulatory cyber security program, it 
also acknowledged the need for collaboration with the United States. While the BND or 
the government might not have been aware of the scope of the NSA surveillance 
programs, it must have cooperated on the implementation of its own program. Chancellor 
Merkel remained in the background throughout the beginning of the scandal. Despite 
reassuring the German public of the need for privacy, she laid more emphasis on the 
value of cyber security. With this inactivity, she actively risked her domestic support in a 
critical time during her electoral campaign to restore public trust in the transatlantic 
relationship. She took the risk with the assumption that Germany and the United States 
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had equally strong participation and a mutual dependence in ensuring the security of 
cyberspace. The revelation of her victimization, however, removed this equal playing 
field on which security measures were enforced. The NSA spying programs went beyond 
the exchange of relevant data and revealed their sole foundation on U.S. security 
interests. The threat of economic espionage on German corporations intensified this 
perspective.  
The scandal and its politicization, therefore, uncovered several issues of 
contention pertaining to cyber surveillance. The protection of privacy and the 
enforcement of security measures have traditionally been at the forefront of policy 
debates pertaining to security in the Internet. Especially reactions from the German 
public—the priority of pacifism and aversion to military involvement in cyberspace—
have demonstrated that the balance between privacy and security will remain a major 
challenge. The symbolic aspect of and diplomatic responses to the scandal, however, 
have revealed the need to reorganize the roles of individual governments in enforcing this 
balance. The scope of the NSA programs has shown that autonomy in cyber security—
the ability to enforce one’s own security needs and views regarding privacy in 
cyberspace—is determined through technological capacity. Chancellor Merkel’s shift in 
reacting more dominantly consequently represents the acknowledgment of the Internet as 
a valuable resource in the security realm on the one hand, and the need for an equal 
playing field in utilizing this resource as a security measure on the other. 
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Virtual Fear and Cyber Surveillance 
 The scandal brought forth the inevitable need for a more equal playing ground in 
utilizing cyberspace as a resource for international security. The creation of this equal 
playing ground requires an evaluation of the various security threats. Current evaluations, 
however, mainly rely on speculation and a continuation of broader security strategies in 
the realm of cyber security. Different policy responses reflect the priorities, values, and 
security needs states ascribe to cyberspace and complicate the equal utilization of the 
Internet as a security resource. A look at the legal and institutional structures pertaining 
to cyber security and privacy reveal a strong divide in security objectives between the 
United States and Europe. Even before the September 11 attacks, the Foreign Intelligence 
Service Act (FISA) built the foundation for prioritizing the security of cyberspace 
through regulation and surveillance over the protection of privacy. Subsequent changes in 
the administration of intelligence services, along with more drastic legal changes after 
9/11 amplified the exaggeration of security and intelligence in cyberspace. These events 
have demonstrated the intensifying of an environment of fear and the value of gathering 
data in the United States. In contrast, states in continental Europe, particularly Germany, 
have—based on an evaluation of their legal systems—viewed the protection of privacy in 
cyberspace as a security objective in itself. While possible collaboration with NSA 
surveillance and the implementation of similar programs in Germany may indicate an 
interest in cyber surveillance, the relationship between intelligence and privacy is by far 
less out of balance as it is in the United States. The analysis of legal systems and 
institutions provides an understanding of how individual states and their intelligence 
services attempt to enforce their security objectives in a space that lacks international 
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regulation. This understanding contributes to the overarching discussion on state 
sovereignty in cyber security.  
Cyber surveillance represents one of the many policy responses to cyber terrorism 
and is the strategy for which the NSA has drawn public and international criticism in the 
last year. James Gravelle notes that intelligence agencies have dramatically increased 
their surveillance in recent years—a result of the fact that terrorists have quickly adapted 
to the information revolution, now potentially having the capacity to employ more 
advanced technology to disrupt the security of states (Gravelle, 111). As Gravelle puts 
surveillance in the broader context of knowledge-management, he points out that this 
process consists of several steps, ranging from the gathering of data to evaluation, 
interpretation, and to information exchange with other organizations (113, 119). Even 
though governments can extract useful information from data through the management of 
knowledge and close evaluation of data, he notes that, “many organisations simply store 
rather than process data. This mindset often over-focuses on the quantitative approach, 
concerned with capturing figures and numbers. The second stage in the process is to 
transform data into information” (113). Gravelle’s findings suggest that intelligence 
services generally do not implement efficient programs to target specific information on 
terrorist activity but are rather driven by an irrational exaggeration of security threats and 
desire for perceived protection in the short-term.  
The excessive focus on the quantity of data gathered reinforces the psychological 
effects of speculative nature of cyber terrorism. Thomas suggests that online propaganda 
and the wide variety of outlets for public messages allow terrorist groups to exaggerate 
their scope of influence and actual size (Thomas, 115). This strategy, according to 
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Thomas, “produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life. People are afraid of 
things that are invisible and things they don’t understand” (115). Statements by Theresa 
May, the British Home Secretary, from 2011 confirm Thomas’s argument: upon warning 
against the growing sophistication of the technological knowledge of terrorist groups, 
May specifically referred to al Qaeda, a group that supposedly called for “cyber-jihad” 
(Awan, 21). For British and U.S. officials, possible vulnerabilities in cyber space and the 
exaggeration of terrorists’ online presence have created an environment of fear that has 
resulted in the transformation of cyber surveillance into a top priority in national security.  
As Gravelle’s theory implies, this priority has manifested itself in the way in 
which U.S. and British intelligence agencies conduct cyber surveillance. It has also 
manifested itself in several institutional and policy changes that facilitate the 
implementation of cyber surveillance and other security measures. The U.S. Air Force, 
for instance, included cyberspace in its mission statement as one of its domains of 
protection and established the Air Force Cyber Space Command in 2005 and 2006 
respectively (Joyner, 2012, 163-64). Additionally, the United States Cyber Command—
lead by General Keith Alexander—was added to the Defense Department in 2010, 
furthering the militarization of the Internet (164). Jason Healey argues that the 
classification process initiated by General Alexander marked the beginning of an 
imbalance between security and privacy in the United States; enabling the NSA to 
enforce its security values onto cyberspace without government regulation: “Since 
classification levels permitted few, if any, outside voices, the seeming consensus helped 
convince U.S. policymakers to adopt General Alexander's ‘collect it all’ strategy and 
create a new U.S. Cyber Command to streamline military cyber power” (Healey, 2013). 
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The NSA case has demonstrated how classification and few institutional changes can 
contribute to the militarization of cyberspace. The environment of uncertainty and semi-
imaginary understanding of a perceived security threat in cyberspace to which Patrick 
Jagoda (2012) refers to as “Speculative Security” have legitimized excessive data 
gathering by U.S. and British intelligence services. The governance of the NSA by 
General Alexander has also confirmed Gravelle’s and Tim Read’s observation that 
domestic and international cooperation among different institutions is crucial to 
managing information and that the isolation of a particular organization can undermine 
sovereignty and limit the efficiency of security measures (Gravelle, 119; Read, 2012, 
159).  
 
Data Protection in the United States and Germany 
While the perceived threat originates from speculation, the security measures 
have severe implications for the protection of privacy. The Foreign Intelligence Service 
Act of 1978 and subsequent amendments perfectly exemplify these implications. FISA 
represented an exceptional rule to criminal investigations: traditionally, the Fourth 
Amendment protected U.S. citizens from unwarranted searches without probable cause. 
FISA lowered the standards by which intelligence services were able to receive warrants; 
a measure legitimized by the significance of foreign intelligence investigations (Jaeger, 
Bertot, McClure, 2003, 297). Since put in place until the year 1999, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service Court (FISC), overseeing the investigations under FISA, received 
11,883 FISA warrants—all of them were granted (Jaeger et al., 297). Adding to the 
already wide range of actions FISA granted intelligence services, the September 11 
 53 
attacks in 2001 brought forth the passing of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“Patriot 
Act”), which, according to Jaeger et al, increased this range of action (299-300). The 
following table shows the ways in which the Patriot Act was expected to alter selected 
regulations of the Foreign Intelligence Service Act: 
 
Patriot Act (Section of Act) Proposed Patriot II (Section of Draft) 
Intelligence need only be a “significant” 
purpose of an investigation (§ 218) 
Expanded definitions of “foreign powers” (§§ 
101-102, 111) 
Records now include any tangible thing that 
could contain information (§ 215) 
Subject of investigation need not be violating 
federal law (§ 102) 
The secrecy clause prevents discussion of 
investigations (§ 215) 
Immunity for private entities that voluntary 
provide information (§ 313) 
Expanded use of roving wiretaps, pen registers, 
and trap and trace devices (§§ 206-207, 214, 
216) 
Simplified access for investigators to credit and 
financial information (§ 313) 
Surveillance of electronic and voice mail 
communications (§§ 209-210) 
Increased Attorney General powers to 
authorize warrantless FISA investigations (§§ 
103-104) 
Increased sharing of information from 
investigations between agencies and levels of 
government (§ 203) 
Prohibition against the use of encryption 
technologies (§ 404) 
 Further expansion of information sharing from 
investigation between government agencies (§ 
105) 
Table adopted from Jaeger et al., 2003, 299 
 
While these laws have expanded the legal ground for intelligence services to 
conduct surveillance, they lack the counterbalance of institutions or laws protecting the 
privacy of all U.S. citizens. The Fourth Amendment, which confines the protection of 
privacy to preventing home searches without probable cause, has built the constitutional 
foundation for data protection in the United States. Since its framing is largely limited by 
the physical space of the home, however; it has often been at the center of debate since 
the United States has increasingly relied on information technology since the 1920s 
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(Harper, 2006, 33). The Privacy Act of 1974 marked an adaptation to the privacy needs 
of citizens in the information age, pertaining mostly to the maintaining of records and a 
requirement for agencies to disclose purposes and means of record keeping (38). 
However, the U.S. Justice Department, in an evaluation of the Privacy Act in 2004, noted 
that its broad and ambiguous regulations complicate its application, making it rather 
useless in adequately ensuring privacy (38). Harper notes that intelligence services still 
maintain some freedom to overcome the citizen’s rights based on the lack of clarity in the 
disclosure process: “Privacy Act statements, which are required on the forms used to 
collect information from citizens, are insufficient in that they do not remind citizens that 
uses of information can be changed merely on notice published in an obscure publication 
called the Federal Register” (38). He adds that the influence of the U.S. Privacy 
Protection Study Commission, which took charge of evaluating and reporting on the 
efficiency of the Privacy Act in 1975, lasted for only two years when it released 
“Personal Privacy in an Information Society” in 1977 (38). More recent legal adaptations 
that responded especially to the rise of businesses in cyberspace mostly pertained to very 
specific groups of individuals operating online (42). These include, among others, the 
oversight of privacy practices for children, individuals and organizations in the health 
care sector, and firms in the financial services industry (40-41). 
In addition to the legal measures regarding privacy in the United States, the 
assignment of institutions that oversee privacy protection reveals a more economically 
minded approach to privacy: as only few states such as California have established 
freestanding institutions specifically overseeing privacy concerns of citizens, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) serves as the main regulator of consumer privacy (47). Axel 
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Spies argues that, while the FTC deals with cases of privacy concerns in cyberspace, it is 
mainly concerned with the broader concept of consumer protection (Spies, 2012, 10). 
This fact exemplifies the key difference between German and U.S. perceptions of 
privacy: in Germany, privacy implies the legal obligation of data protection; in the United 
States, privacy refers to a right to privacy, which falls under the broader range of rights 
citizens are granted as consumers (8).  
The analysis of the legal developments regarding surveillance and privacy 
confirm the way in which pre-existing ways of law enforcement and exercise of power 
translate onto the governance of cyberspace. Even though U.S. Congress implemented 
the Privacy Act and subsequent specialized laws on areas in cyber security, it did not 
adequately adapt its laws to the increasing need of privacy in cyberspace to limit the 
scope of exercising sovereignty. Instead, the combination of FISA and Patriot Act 
reinforce the priority on intelligence. The United States not only maintained its pre-
existing security measures but also extended them to fully utilize the wealth of 
information cyberspace generates. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Cyberspace has revealed itself as a new territory in which states seek to follow 
their security objectives and, in broader terms, to enforce their sovereignty. Even though 
distinct features of cyberspace—the present lack of legitimization of sovereignty, the 
ambiguity of territory, and the accessibility of private information—require a drastic 
redefinition of how sovereignty manifests itself, states still resort to traditional measures 
of exercising power. In the case of German-American relations, the United States seeks 
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to project its longstanding hegemony and its past influence on German sovereignty onto 
its security measures in the cyber realm. Germany’s reemergence in international 
security, however, has decreased the functionality of U.S. influence in German security, 
causing the state to desire a more active role in enforcing its security values. Due to the 
evolution of German sovereignty, however, this more active role can exist merely within 
the context of EU integration and security policy. This polarization between U.S. and 
European security interests has traditionally presented a short-term issue in transatlantic 
relations; the manifestation of these differences in cyberspace, however, creates a long-
term governance issue.  
While the United States could rely on short-term coalition building with regards 
to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, the significance of cyberspace in 
redefining state sovereignty creates a more fundamental issue that requires a 
collaborative evaluation of security threats and an equal playing ground to react to these 
threats. International cooperation would help eliminate the speculative nature of cyber 
security and eventually the exaggeration of security measures. Additionally, it would 
build the foundation for international norms in protecting privacy and combating cyber 
crime and future threats of cyber terrorism. Increased transparency among states, 
particularly in the transatlantic partnership, would benefit not only the protection of civil 
liberties but also the effectiveness of intelligence services in cyberspace. As Gravelle’s 
study has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of present cyber surveillance programs due to 
a lack of information production, more transparency and information exchange would 
allow intelligence services across the Atlantic to target and evaluate information in a 
more focused, qualitative manner. Since German officials have acknowledged the need 
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for a certain degree of surveillance in cyberspace, the realization of this cooperative 
approach depends on the United States’ acknowledgment of the new power dynamic 
within the transatlantic community and a more proactive oversight of its intelligence 
service in cyberspace. 
This dependence indicates that, at this point, German foreign policy in the cyber 
age remains linked to U.S. foreign policy interests. The link represents a historical 
remainder of Germany’s unique reemergence as a sovereign and autonomous actor in 
international security. Therefore, the development of cyberspace provides an occasion to 
redefine not only state sovereignty but also the underlying values and interests shaping 
the future of German-American relations. 
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